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This paper investigates the persistence of aggregate wages and prices in Por-
tugal assuming a model of a unionized economy with imperfect competition. An
impulse response analysis is conducted where the structural shocks are identi￿ed
by taking into account the long-run properties of the model, as well as the coin-
tegrating and weak-exogeneity properties of the system. Real wages and wage
in￿ ation emerge as especially persistent following an import price shock, while
price in￿ ation is more persistent following an unemployment shock. At the busi-
ness cycle horizon variation in the forecast errors of wages is attributable mainly to
unemployment shocks (about 80 percent), whereas variation in the forecast errors
of prices is attributable mainly to import price shocks (about 60 percent) and to
unemployment shocks (around 20 percent). Productivity shocks explain somewhat
less than 10 percent of the variation in forecast errors of wages and prices.
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11 Introduction
Labour market rigidity is widely recognised as a crucial issue for macroeconomics and
notably for monetary policy. Moreover, the importance of labour market rigidities is es-
pecially acute in monetary unions, where labour market ￿ exibility is seen as a substitute
for the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and for independent monetary policy.
Recent literature has re-a¢ rmed the importance of wage rigidities for the evolution
of the macro economy in response to shocks. Erceg et al. (2000) show that introducing
staggered nominal wage setting in addition to staggered price setting in their optimising-
agent model changes the conclusions about the optimal monetary policy rules, as opposed
to the case when staggered price setting is the sole form of nominal rigidity. Christiano
et al. (2005) conclude that stickiness in nominal wages is crucial for the performance of
their model while stickiness in prices plays a relatively small role. Levin et al. (2005)
show that the shape of the distribution of wage contracts in staggered wage-setting
models matters signi￿cantly for monetary policy. In turn, Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007)
demonstrate that allowing for real wage rigidities in the standard new Keynesian model
the so-called "divine coincidence" disappears and central banks face a trade-o⁄between
stabilising in￿ ation and stabilising the welfare relevant output-gap.
In the real world the existence of price and nominal wage rigidities is expected to
translate into persistent responses of real wages, as well as of price and wage in￿ ation
to shocks hitting the economy. Evaluating the degree of persistence of such responses is
thus an issue of paramount importance.
This paper evaluates persistence of wages and prices in the Portuguese economy,
within a structural vector error-correction model (SVECM) framework by assuming a
model of a unionized economy with imperfect competition, where wages are determined
through collective bargaining and prices are set by imperfectly competitive ￿rms. Our
econometric approach follows very closely the analysis in King et al. (1991) and Jacobson
et al. (1997) as regards the identi￿cation of the shocks, and in contrast to the approaches
2that use simple bivariate SVAR models (see, for instance, Moore and Pentecost, 2006)
it has the advantage of allowing to separate the e⁄ects of the responses of wages and
prices to real and nominal permanent, as well as transitory shocks.
Following our theoretical model an empirical VAR model involving nominal wages,
prices, the unemployment rate, productivity and import prices is estimated and three
permanent and two transitory structural shocks are identi￿ed. The three permanent
shocks, which by de￿nition are allowed to have signi￿cant long-run impacts on some
or all the variables of the system, are labelled as "import price", "productivity" and
"unemployment" shocks and are identi￿ed using the properties of the theoretical model,
as well as the cointegrating and weak-exogeneity properties of the system. The two
transitory shocks, which we label as "wage" and "price" shocks are identi￿ed by imposing
restrictions on the matrix of the contemporaneous e⁄ects and, by de￿nition, they are
not allowed to have any long-run impact on the variables of the system.
From the impulse response functions measures of persistence are computed for nom-
inal wages and prices, as well as for real wages, wage and price in￿ ation. As expected,
we ￿nd that the relative persistence of wages and prices (including real wages and wage
and price in￿ ation) varies with the type of shock hitting the economy. In particular,
real wages are especially persistent following a permanent import price shock such that
only 53 percent of the total disequilibrium dissipates in the ￿rst two years after the
shock. This compares to 66 percent in the case of a permanent unemployment shock
and 69 percent in the case of a permanent productivity shock. Similar conclusions hold
for wage in￿ ation. Two years after the shock only 31 percent of the total disequilibrium
has dissipated in case of an import price shock, compared to 51 percent in the case
of the unemployment shock and to 59 percent in the case of a productivity shock. In
contrast, price in￿ ation is more persistent following a permanent unemployment shock,
as only 42 percent of the total disequilibrium dissipates in the ￿rst two years, compared
to 53 percent in the case of a permanent import price shock. These results accord with
3intuition because an import price shock impacts directly on domestic prices and only
indirectly on wages, while an unemployment shock impacts directly on wages and mainly
indirectly on prices through lower wages.
From the analysis of the forecast-errors variance decompositions we conclude that
at the business cycle horizon (3-5 years) variation in the forecast errors of wages are
attributable mainly to unemployment shocks (about 80 percent) whereas variation in
the forecast errors of prices are attributable mainly to import price shocks (around 60
percent) and to unemployment shocks (around 20 percent). Productivity shocks explain
a relatively small proportion of the forecast errors in wages and prices (somewhat less
than 10 percent). By looking at the historical decompositions we conclude that the
decline in in￿ ation in the period 1996-2001 is attributable to the permanent import
price shock, as well as to the transitory price shock, whereas for the most recent period
(after 2002) only the permanent import price shock plays a major role. In turn, the
forecast errors in wages are mainly attributable to the permanent unemployment shock
for all the sample period (with the transitory wage shock also playing a role in the period
1996-1998).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 describes the data set used in the empirical section. Section 4 presents the
econometric analysis. Section 5 discusses the identi￿cation of the shocks, looks at the
impulse response functions including the forecast-errors variance decompositions and
computes some measures of persistence for nominal wages and prices, including real
wages and wage and price in￿ ation. Section 6 concludes.
2 A theoretical model of wages and prices
This section brie￿ y presents and discusses the so-called wage-bargaining approach to
the process of wage determination. In this approach it is assumed that wages are de-
termined through a bargaining process between ￿rms and labour unions in an economy
4with imperfect competition1. The wage-bargaining approach emerges as the natural
choice to model the process of wage determination in the Portuguese labour market.
In fact, collective wage agreements usually covering a whole industry predominate in
the Portuguese economy, such that the wages of 90 percent of the Portuguese private
sector workforce in 2005 (97.6 percent in 1995 and 96 percent in 2000) were set through
collective wage agreements, thus involving a bargaining process between labour unions
and employers organizations2.
2.1 Wage formation
The wage bargaining formulation can be derived directly from a model with pro￿t max-
imizing ￿rms and utility maximizing consumers organised in labour unions3. This type
of models predicts that the bargaining solution will depend on the real producer wage
and productivity on the ￿rm side, and on the real consumer wage from the workers side.
A simple log-linear form of the wage equation corresponding to the bargaining solution
can be written as (with lower case letters denoting logs):
w ￿ q = k1 + ￿(p ￿ q) + ￿h ￿ ￿u + "!; 0 ￿ ￿;￿ ￿ 1;￿ ￿ 0; (1)
where w is the target or equilibrium nominal wage rate, q is the producer price level,
p is the consumer price level, h is labour productivity and u the unemployment rate.
Expressed in nominal wages equation (1) may be rewritten as:
w = k1 + (1 ￿ ￿)q + ￿p + ￿h ￿ ￿u + "!; (2)
1For text book expositions of the model see, for instance, Layard et al. (1991), Lindbeck (1993) or
Bardsen et al. (2005). The presentation in this section follows closely the discussion in Bardsen and
Fisher (1999), PØtursson (2002), Bardsen et al. (2005) and Bardsen et al. (2006).
2For a detailed description of the Portuguese collective wage bargaining process, see Cardoso and
Portugal (2005).
3See, for instance, Nickell and Andrews (1983) and PØtursson and Slok (2001).
5where the homogeneity of nominal wages with respect to prices is apparent.
Equation (1) is a general proposition about the bargaining outcome and its determi-
nants and will be used to describe wage formation in the Portuguese economy. According
to (1) the real wage faced by ￿rms (real producer wage) is a⁄ected by (p ￿ q), h and u.
The relative price (p ￿ q) = (w ￿ q) ￿ (w ￿ p) which measures the di⁄erence between
the producer real wage and the consumer real wage, is usually referred to as the price
wedge, and plays an important role in theoretical wage bargaining models. The coef-
￿cient ￿ can be interpreted as a measure of "real wage resistance" (see Layard et al.,
1991, ch.4.7), which occurs if the unions are able to obtain higher wages to compensate
for exogenous changes in workers￿living standards (increases in p brought about, for
example, by changes in indirect taxes)4.
The bargaining solution (1) also implies that an increase in labour productivity, h,
will increase wages, since higher productivity increases the pro￿tability of ￿rms, so they
are more likely to accept higher wage claims from the unions. Note that if ￿ = 1 the
bargaining solution is in terms of unit labour costs, w ￿ h, i.e., all gains in labour
productivity will be re￿ ected in the wage rate, in the long run.
The unemployment rate u represents the degree of tightness in the labour market
which in￿ uences the outcome of the bargaining process through the relative bargaining
power of the labour unions and employers organizations. The elasticity ￿ is a key para-
meter in the wage curve literature as it measures the responsiveness of wages to changes
in unemployment and thus is a measure of the ￿ exibility of real wages. The magnitude
of ￿ may be expected to depend on the relative bargaining power of the labour unions
4In empirical applications the role of the wedge may depend on the level of aggregation of the analysis.
In the traded sector exposed to international competition it may be reasonable to assume that ￿ = 0,
i.e., wages are determined by the ability to pay by ￿rms, such that the price wedge has no long-run e⁄ect
on wages and the bargaining solution fully re￿ ects the real producer wage, w ￿ q. In the non-traded
sector however negotiated wages are expected to be linked to domestic price level. Depending on the
relative size of the two sectors, the implied weight on the consumer price may become relatively large
in an aggregate wage equation. In the limit if ￿ = 1, the price wedge will have a proportional long
run e⁄ect on the producer real wage, i.e., the bargaining solution fully re￿ ects the consumer real wage,
w ￿p. However, as we shall see later on, in the context of our model the parameter ￿ is not estimable,
as we need to assume ￿ = 1 in order to get the long-run wage equation identi￿ed.
6and employers organizations, on the disutility of job loss, the exercise of insider power,
as well as on the degree of bargaining coordination. For given levels of measured un-
employment the disutility of job loss is lower if unemployment bene￿t level is high or if
bene￿t entitlements have a long duration, and the insider power is increased for higher
employment protection (see, Layard et al.,1991, ch.4). In turn, a high degree of coordi-
nation, especially on the employer side and centralisation of bargaining may be expected
to induce more responsiveness of wages to unemployment than uncoordinated systems
(￿rm or industry-level bargaining) that give little incentives to solidarity in bargaining
(see, Layard et al., 1991, ch.2, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
The wage equation sometimes includes additional terms not explicitly considered in
equation (1) that may a⁄ect the bargaining outcome, namely some institutional features
of the labour market. Examples of such terms are changes in the employers and employ-
ees tax rates, in the replacement ratio (ratio between unemployment insurance payments
and earnings), in the reservation wage (the wage equivalent of being unemployed), in the
union power and in the unemployment composition (short-term versus long-term unem-
ployment)5. These aspects will not be explicitly modelled or taken into account in the
present study mainly due to the absence of data, but also because the empirical evidence
for other countries suggests that they do not seem very important in explaining wages
in the long run. Moreover, as far as the Portuguese labour market is concerned, some of
these variables, such as the replacement ratio or the duration of bene￿t entitlements, do
not seem to have undergone signi￿cant changes during the sample period6. Nevertheless,
as for the e⁄ects of this omission on the empirical results reported below, we note that
the ￿nding of cointegrating relations within the information set used implies that the
5See, among others, Nickell and Andrews (1983), Layard et al. (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1999).
6The replacement ratio has not changed during our sample period (it was basically equal to 65
percent of the previous wage), but in 1999 some changes were introduced in the entitlement period of
unemployment insurance that seem to have had some consequences for the duration of some categories of
unemployment spells (see Centeno and Novo, 2007). It is however unclear whether such changes should
be expected to have a noticeable impact in the long-run equilibrium level of aggregate unemployment.
7omitted factors are not important in the long run, so that their e⁄ects may be seen as
subsumed in the stationary part of the model.
2.2 Price formation
In an economy with imperfect competition producers target their prices, q, as a mark
up,  , over marginal costs. If there are constant returns to scale, marginal costs are
constant and therefore prices are set as a mark-up over unit labour costs:
q =   + (w ￿ h): (3)
The mark-up is not necessarily constant and in an open-economy it may be a function of
the level of international competitiveness (Layard et al., 1991, ch. 8.4). This allows for
a pricing-to-market e⁄ect with the mark-up inversely related to the elasticity of demand
(see, for instance, Krugman, 1987):
  = k2 + ￿(z ￿ q) + "q; k2;￿ ￿ 0; (4)
where z is the domestic currency price of imperfect substitute tradable goods produced
abroad (imports) and ￿ re￿ ects the exposure of domestic ￿rms to international compe-
tition. Thus, the greater the pricing-to-market e⁄ect (smaller ￿) the less is the pass-
through from foreign price or exchange rate shocks to domestic prices. The residual "q
may include other factors that also a⁄ect the mark-up.
Substituting (4) into (3) gives the target producer price level as a mark-up over unit














8If we further assume that consumer prices are a weighted average of producer and import
prices:
p = (1 ￿ ￿)q + ￿z; 0 < ￿ < 1; (6)














where consumer prices appear as a weighted average of unit labour costs and import
prices.
From this equation we see that there are two channels through which foreign price
and exchange rate shocks impact on domestic consumer prices. First, there is a direct
channel through imported goods given by ￿. Second, a rise in import prices reduces
competitiveness of foreign ￿rms allowing domestic producers to increase their mark-up
and the price of their products.
Substituting (6) into (2) and using the price equation in (7) we obtain the long-run
wage and price equations estimated in this paper (ignoring the constants for simplicity):
w = (1 + ￿)p ￿ ￿z + ￿h ￿ ￿u + ec(w); (8)
p = ￿(w ￿ h) + (1 ￿ ￿)z + ec(p); (9)
where ￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿)7.
We view the wage and price equations, (8) and (9), as long-run or equilibrium targets
that are not necessarily achieved by workers and ￿rms in a speci￿c time period. The
7As an alternative or in addition to the level of international competitiveness in (4), one could allow
the price mark-up to depend on domestic demand relative to domestic capacity. In this case it would
be possible to further replace capacity utilization with the rate of unemployment (using the Okhun￿ s
law) and the unemployment rate would appear in equation (4) and logically also in the price equation
(9) (See Bardsen et al., 2005, ch. 5, or Layard et al., 1991, ch. 8.). We choose speci￿cation (4) because
Portugal is a small open economy where international competitiveness may be expected to be important
for the price formation process.
9residual ec(w) measures the disequilibrium between actual wages and the equilibrium
or target wages at each point in time. The wage bargaining solution implies that when
actual wages are below the equilibrium target wage, i.e., ec(w) < 0, labour unions will
bid up the wage rate to restore the long-run equilibrium. In turn ec(p) measures the
disequilibrium between actual consumer prices and the equilibrium or target consumer
prices. Even though equation (9) is in terms of consumer prices the adjustment mecha-
nism is better understood in terms of producer prices, equations (5) and (6). If the actual
producer price is below the target price, ￿rms start raising prices towards the long-run
target. This raises consumption prices through (6). The capacity of ￿rms to react to
changes in unit labour costs (w ￿ h) and foreign prices, z, is determined by the elas-
ticity of demand for their goods. The less the market power of domestic ￿rms (greater
￿) the more are domestic prices a⁄ected by international prices. The pass-through of
foreign price and exchange rate shocks, 1 ￿ ￿ = (￿ + ￿)=(1 + ￿) is the larger the larger
the share of imported goods in the consumption basket (larger ￿) or the smaller the
pricing-to-market (larger ￿).
Solving equations (8) and (9) for w and p (and ignoring the residuals) we get the
steady-state solution that re￿ ects the joint determination of these two variables as a
function of the variables z; h and u:
w = z +
￿
1 ￿









p = z ￿
￿









In this reduced form system it is apparent that prices and wages display long-run homo-
geneity with respect to import prices. The parameter ￿ determines how the productivity
gain is distributed between ￿rms and employees. If 0 < ￿ < 1 an increase in productivity
will lead to a fall in equilibrium prices and an increase in equilibrium wages. Notwith-
standing the rise in the real wages will be less than proportional leading to a fall in the
10labour share. Moreover, in this case equation (11) implies a wedge between domestic
and foreign in￿ ation.
However, if ￿ = 1 wages will completely absorb productivity gains, but prices are not
a⁄ected so that the wage share in consumer prices will be una⁄ected. In fact if ￿ = 1
we get:






so that in the long run the labour share in consumer prices depends solely on the un-
employment rate. Furthermore, in this case, from equation (11) we obtain the standard
open economy result that the steady-state rate of domestic in￿ ation is equal to the rate
of in￿ ation abroad8.
3 The data
To investigate the model above for the Portuguese economy we use quarterly data for
the period 1992q2 to 2006q4. Even though our original quarterly data set dates back
to 1978, there is a large set of reasons suggesting that the use of data prior to 1992
should be avoided9. Even though this choice has the obvious implication of reducing the
8In this type of models the equilibrium unemployment rate, which may be obtained by solving (1),
(5) and (6) for the unemployment rate, depends among other factors on productivity. It is easy to show
that the equilibrium unemployment rate falls when productivity increases if ￿ < 1 but it is independent
of productivity if ￿ = 1. This is consistent with the absence of a signi￿cant long-run downward trend
in the unemployment rate, despite a signi￿cant long-run trend growth of productivity in most countries
(see Layard et al., 1991).
9Some of the reasons why we think it is advisable to exclude from the analysis the data prior to
1992q2 are the following: 1) Signi￿cant changes in the unemployment insurance bene￿t system occurred
in 1985, and were followed, in 1989, by changes in the eligibility criteria for insurance bene￿t and in
the entitlement duration period (see, Bover et al., 2000, for details); 2) During the second half of the
1980s a new remuneration system for the government employees was introduced, which brought about
large wage increases in the government sector and thus, contaminated the data on global wages in a
way that cannot be explained in the context of the model used in this paper; 3) In the early nineties a
new monetary policy regime was put into practice by the Portuguese central bank aiming at reaching
nominal convergence by 1998 and thus meeting the Maastricht criteria for full participation in the future
European Monetary Union (EMU); 4) In 1992q2 a new quarterly unemployment survey with important
methodological changes (new sampling procedures and rede￿nition of the key unemployment variable)
was introduced and 5) Some changes in the VAT rates with signi￿cant contemporaneous impact on the
consumer price index occurred in the ￿rst and second quarters of 1992. On the top of these country
speci￿c events, the emergence of the EMU, with the Maastricht treaty signed in 1992, brought about
11degrees of freedom of our estimated model it however has the advantage of also reducing
the probability of signi￿cant structural breaks occurring during the estimation period
and of allowing us to focus on the most recent period of the Portuguese economy.
All the series are seasonally adjusted. To measure wages, w, we use compensation per
employee for the whole economy. Productivity, h, is measured by the ratio of real GDP
to total employment and import prices, z, are measured by the total imports de￿ ator.
Consumer prices, p, are measured by the consumer price index (CPI)10.
Figure 1 plots the levels of the logs of all ￿ve variables including the real wage, the
unit labour costs and the labour share and Figure 2 plots the ￿rst di⁄erences of some
of these variables. From Figure 1 we can see that the real wage increased steadily over
the nineties but slowed down afterwards. The labour share, w ￿ p ￿ h exhibits a very
similar time pattern. It increases until the year 2000 and exhibits a slightly decreasing
trend afterwards. An important point to keep in mind is the fact that the labour share
does not behave as a stationary variable during the sample period.
In this paper we assume that w, p, h, z and u are all I(1) variables. Such an
assumption, is consistent with the results of the unit-root tests reported in Table 1. In
fact, from this Table we conclude that according to the ADF statistic the null of a unit
root is not rejected for w, p, h, z and u at standard signi￿cance levels, while the null of
a unit root is rejected for ￿w, ￿h, ￿z at a 5% test and for ￿p and ￿u at (around) a
10% test.
In addition to the results of the unit roots tests it is important to notice that treating
all the variables as I(1) is also the most sensible choice for the properties of the data,
given the theoretical features of our model. As we shall see below, h, z and u are weakly-
exogenous for the parameters of the wage and price equations which means that they
several changes with far reaching consequences for the way the economy worked. In particular, the
coming into force of the Single European Market at the start of 1993 marked a decisive step in the
creation of a wider market for goods and services with the full mobility of people, goods and capital.
10With the exception of the CPI, all the remaining series may be downloaded from the Banco de
Portugal webpage.
12are used to de￿ne the common trends of our model and thus, may be seen as the source
of the nonstationarity of the system. Thus, if they are assumed I(1) (the most plausible
choice) this prevents us from treating w, and p as I(2) variables, despite ￿w and ￿p
seeming to display some nonstationarity in Figure 2.
As regards unemployment one alternative would be to treat it as a stationary variable,
as there are theoretical grounds to argue that the population unemployment rate should
be seen as I(0). However, virtually all the papers in the empirical literature dealing with
wage-price models treat the unemployment rate as I(1) (see, for instance, Bardsen et al.,
2006, PØtursson and Slok, 2001, PØtursson, 2002, Bardsen and Fisher, 1999, Greenslade
et al., 2002, Marcellino and Mizon, 2000, 2001). In doing so, it is sometimes argued (see,
for instance, PØtursson, 2002 and Bardsen et al., 2006) that it does not matter whether
we regard unemployment as I(1) or I(0) as both can be handled in a cointegrating
VAR and thus, the essential issue is rather whether or not the resultant long-run wage
equation is a valid cointegration equation. This claim however does not go without
problems because assuming that unemployment is I(0) has strong implications for the
identi￿cation of the long-run wage equation. In this paper we treat unemployment as
I(1) not only because such an assumption is not rejected by the data, but also because,
as we shall discuss below, it is required for the identi￿cation of the wage equation.
4 Econometric Analysis
The theoretical model developed above proposes two behavioural equations one for wages
and one for prices, but does not suggest any long-run behavioural equation for unem-
ployment, productivity or import prices. These three variables appear in the model
because we think they may a⁄ect wages and/or prices but the model does not include
the many variables we believe might explain productivity, unemployment or the import
prices. In fact, even though in a real world wages may a⁄ect unemployment and produc-
tivity (e¢ ciency wages theory) and productivity may also a⁄ect unemployment, these
13relations are not likely to imply further cointegrating vectors in our data set, given the
absence of other relevant variables. On the other hand, the model does not also suggest
that the disequilibrium in the wage and price equations should appear in the equations
for unemployment, productivity and import prices. In other words, the model assumes
the existence of only two cointegrating or long-run equations, one for wages and one for
prices, and that u, h and z may be weakly-exogenous for the parameters of the long-run
wage and price equations.
All these, of course, are testable assumptions of the model. In order to see whether
the model is data consistent we start by estimating a full-system VAR model in the
￿ve variables: w;p;u;h; and z: The ￿rst objective of the exercise will be to identify the
long-run wage and price equations and test whether or not unemployment, productivity
and import prices can be treated as weakly-exogenous for the purpose of the wage-price
system, consistently with the theoretical model presented above11.
4.1 Full-system cointegration analysis
Consider a VAR model with w, p, u, h and z entering with k lags. Once there is no
reason to believe that the long-run wage and price equations are stationary around a
deterministic trend we do not allow for deterministic trends restricted to the cointe-
gration space. However, since the data are trending the VAR includes an unrestricted
constant. In addition four dummy variables (one step and three impulse dummies) are
introduced to allow for special events (namely VAT rate changes) occurred during the
sample period12.
11Testing for the weak-exogeneity status of the variables u;h; and z also prevents invalid inference
from being made in an otherwise misspeci￿ed model if false weak-exogeneity assumptions were imposed
at the outset.
12These are de￿ned as: d1 which equals 1 in 1995q1 and is zero otherwise, d2 which equals 1 in
2005q3 and is zero otherwise, d3 which equals 1 in 2003q1, -1 in 2003q2 and is zero otherwise, and the
step dummy d4 which is zero until 1994q4 and equals 1 from 1995q1 onwards. We note that d1, d2,
and d4 are related to changes in the VAT rates and d3 aims at capturing a signi￿cant change in prices
brought about by oil price increases in an environment of Government energy controlled prices.
14The lag length of the VAR was set equal to three, as this is the smallest number of
lags that ensures that the residuals of the VAR model are normally distributed and do
not exhibit signi￿cant serial correlation. Thus, our reduced form VAR model reads as:




￿i￿xt￿i + ￿Dt + "t; t = 1;2;:::T; (13)
where xt = (w, p, u, h, z), Dt is the vector of the dummy variables, ’ and ￿ are the
(5￿r) matrices of the loading coe¢ cients and cointegrating vectors, respectively, under
the assumption of r cointegrating vectors (with r ￿ 5).
It is well-known that the conventional critical values of the Johansen cointegration
tests are not appropriate when the model includes intervention dummies13. One way
of overcoming this di¢ culty is to look at the model without the intervention dummies,
as in such a case the critical values available in the literature are directly applicable14.
Table 2 reports the Johansen cointegration trace tests for the unrestricted full system,
estimated without the dummy variables. Given that our sample is a small one we
stick the analysis to the small sample corrected tests obtained by using the so-called
Reinsel-Ahn correction factor (Cheung and Lai, 1993) and the Bartlett correction factors
(Johansen, 2002). While the Reinsel-Ahn corrected trace test suggests the existence of
three cointegrating vectors at a 5% signi￿cance level, the Bartlett corrected trace test
suggests the existence of a single cointegrating vector at a 5% signi￿cance level and of
two cointegrating vectors at a 10% signi￿cance level. However, it is known that the
Reinsel-Ahn correction factor leads to tests that tend to be oversized, i.e., tend to ￿nd
too many cointegrating vectors (see Cheung and Lai, 1993 and Greenslade et al., 2002).
Thus, based on the empirical evidence in Table 2, as well as on the characteristics of our
13See, for instance, Johansen and Nielson (1993), Johansen et al. (2000), Mosconi (1998) or Dennis
(2006). Simulating the correct asymptotic critical values using the program DISCO of Johansen and
Nielsen (1993) is worth doing when the sample is large, which is not our case.
14This of course under the assumption that the residuals of the resulting model are normally dis-
tributed and do not exhibit signi￿cant autocorrelation, which is the case of our model. In fact, when
the model is estimated without the intervention dummies we get ￿2(10)=8.37 (P=0.59) for the vector
normality test, and F(100,82)=1.00 (P=0.50) for the vector autocorrelation test of order 1 to 4.
15theoretical model discussed above, the hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors emerges
as the natural choice that reconciles the empirical evidence with the theoretical features
of the model. Therefore, we proceed by discussing the identi￿cation of the long-run wage
and price equations under the assumption of two cointegrating vectors.
4.2 Identi￿cation of the wage and price equations
It is well known that the unrestricted cointegrating vectors are hardly given any eco-
nomically meaningful interpretation. This is often the case in practice and suggests the
importance of using structural information derived from an assumed underlying model
to over-identify the cointegrating vectors15.
The lack of identi￿cation of the wage equation has long ago been recognised in the
literature (see, Layard et al., 1991, ch. 9) but, to our knowledge, it has not yet been
satisfactorily resolved. Here we address the identi￿cation issue in the context of the
speci￿c theoretical model developed in section 2 and the VECM model de￿ned above.
In such a framework the identi￿cation of the long-run wage and price equations
depends on the number of cointegrating vectors of the system. In our case, under the
assumption of two cointegrating vectors, the order condition for identi￿cation of the
wage and price equations (8) and (9) requires one restriction in each equation (besides
normalization)16. If we take into account the theoretical restrictions on the parameters
of the model we see that the theoretical cointegrating vectors in equations (8) and (9) do
meet the order condition for identi￿cation as there is one restriction on the parameters
of equation (8) (which involves the coe¢ cients of p and z) and three restrictions on
parameters of equation (9) (a zero restriction on the coe¢ cient of the unemployment
rate and two restrictions on the coe¢ cients of w, h and z)17. However, the wage equation
15For a discussion see, for instance, S￿derlind and Vredin (1996) or Bardsen and Fisher (1999).
16Identi￿cation of cointegrating vectors has been discussed in Johansen and Juselius (1994), Johansen
(1995) and Pesaran and Shin (2002), among others.
17Note that the order condition would be met even if our model included the unemployment rate in
the price equation (see, footnote 7).
16is not in fact identi￿ed because it does not meet the rank condition for identi￿cation. In
particular, it can be shown that the restriction in the wage equation does not meet the
necessary and su¢ cient condition stated in Theorem 3 of Johansen (1995). The problem
persists even if we impose the additional restriction of ￿ = 1 in equation (8). In such
a case, the restrictions of equation (8) are also met by equation (9), making the rank
condition to fail.
In order to overcome the problem one possibility is to impose ￿ = 0 in equation (8)
such that z drops from the wage equation. In that case it is possible to show that the two
equations do meet the necessary and su¢ cient condition for identi￿cation as postulated
in Johansen (1995), so that both the wage and price equations become identi￿ed. This
identifying restriction amounts at imposing ￿ = 1 at the outset, which means that we
are not able to estimate the degree of real wage resistance. Imposing ￿ = 0 in equation
(8) the system becomes over-identi￿ed with three over-identifying testable restrictions18.
Once we estimate the model imposing these three over-identifying restrictions we
realise that the coe¢ cient of productivity, ￿, becomes close to one. If we further impose
18The identi￿cation here assumes that all the ￿ve variables of the system are I(1). However, as
referred above, sometimes it is claimed that unemployment would be better classi￿ed as I(0) (see, for
instance, Bardsen et al. 2005). Assuming that unemployment is I(0) may have strong consequences
for the identi￿cation of our model, though. If in addition in equation (8) we have ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1,
a result often found the empirical literature (see, for instance, PØtursson, 2002, Bardsen and Fisher,
1998, Bardsen et al., 2006, and also in our case, as we shall see below) then equation (8) implies that
the labour share in consumer prices, s = w ￿ p ￿ h, must be stationary (alternatively, stationarity of
the labour share also follows if ￿ = 1, and the real exchange rate (z ￿p) is stationary). However, if the
labour share is stationary we have a problem with the second cointegrating vector. We note that the
long-run equation (9) may be rewritten as




so that if s is I(0) and (z ￿ p) is I(1) we must have ￿ = 1: This has the undesirable consequence that
we are left with a single cointegrating vector (the labour share) and also unable of introducing a long-
run e⁄ect of import prices on domestic prices, in the model. This of course would represent a major
limitation of the analysis in a small open economy as is the case of Portugal, where we believe that
international prices are the main exogenous driver of domestic prices. On the other hand, if (z ￿ p) is
I(0) from (9) it follows that the labour share must also be stationary (and thus also the unemployment
rate, by equation (8)). In such a case we need to account for the possibility of three cointegrating
vectors or rather three stationary disequilibria: the labour share, s, the real exchange rate, (z ￿ p),
and the unemployment rate, u. Given that in our data set the labour share is not stationary, treating
unemployment as I(1), as we do in this paper may be seen as convenience, which is not contradicted
by the unit root tests performed.
17this restriction we get the following two cointegrating vectors:
w = p + h ￿ 0:059u (14)
p = 0:510(w ￿ h) + 0:490z (15)
where it is worth noticing that the wage equation is such that it implies cointegration
between unemployment and the wage share (or real unit labour cost), which is a result
often found in the empirical literature19. Based on the asymptotic ￿2 critical values,
the likelihood-ratio test for the 4 over-identifying restrictions on the two cointegrating
vectors rejects the null at a 5 percent test but not at 1 percent test (the P-value of
the test is 0.0116). However, the bootstrapped simulated p-value for this test is 0.34
suggesting that the four imposed over-identifying restrictions are data consistent20.
4.3 Testing for weak-exogeneity of u;h; and z.
Having identi￿ed the cointegrating vectors we can now proceed by testing for weak-
exogeneity of unemployment, productivity and import prices. The outcome of the weak-
exogeneity tests for each variable under the assumption of the two cointegrating vectors
(with over-identifying restrictions imposed) is shown in Table 3. From the table we
conclude that we cannot treat wages and prices as weakly-exogenous, but we may treat
each of unemployment, productivity or import price variables as weakly-exogenous for
the parameters of the wage and price equations.
Given the results of the partial weak-exogeneity tests, which accord with what one
could expect in the context of our theoretical model, we can proceed by testing simul-
19See, for instance, DrŁze and Bean (1990) where the wage equations for ￿ve out of ten countries are
error correction models in which the labour shares and unemployment enter the error-correction term.
20It is known that the asymptotic ￿2 critical values may be a very poor approximation for such tests
in small samples. In fact, Monte Carlo simulations conducted in Greenslade et al. (2002) have shown
that tests of over-identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors conducted in a full VAR model
with unrestricted dynamics and (true) weak-exogeneity restrictions not imposed are hugely oversized
(the true set of over-identifying restrictions is rejected 96 percent of the cases, in a test with a nominal
size of 5 percent).
18taneously the full-set of weak-exogeneity restrictions including additionally the weak-
exogeneity restriction of prices for the parameters of the wage equation and the weak-
exogeneity restriction of wages for the parameters of the price equation. This amounts
to test the hypothesis that the wage error-correction term enters the wage equation only,
and that the price error-correction term enters the price equation only.
If not rejected, this hypothesis of 8 weak-exogeneity restrictions in the ’ matrix
(together with the 4 over-identifying restrictions on the two cointegrating vectors of the
￿ matrix) will ensure full compatibility between our empirical model and the theoretical
model postulated in (8) and (9). Such a test may be performed in two di⁄erent ways.
One possibility is to test the full set of eight weak-exogeneity restrictions, conditional on
the restrictions of the ￿ matrix. For such a test we get a likelihood-ratio statistic with
eight degrees of freedom equal to 7.35, with a P-value of 0.50. Thus, the full set of eight
weak-exogeneity restrictions (conditional on the restricted ￿ matrix) is easily accepted
by the data21. The second possibility amounts at testing simultaneously the full set
of 12 restrictions (on the ’ and ￿ matrices). For such a test we get a likelihood-ratio
statistic with 12 degrees of freedom equal to 20.29, with a P-value of 0.062 (based on
the asymptotic ￿2 distribution) so that the null is not rejected at a 5 percent level. We
thus may proceed under the assumption that our theoretical model (including all the
underlying restrictions) is consistent with the data for the period under analysis.
After imposing the 8 weak-exogeneity restrictions (together with the 4 over-
identifying restrictions) the two long-run estimated wage and price equations read as
follows (with asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis):
w = p + h ￿ 0:057
(0:007)
u (16)
21As anticipated above, we note that the weak-exogeneity status of u, h and z implies that the
cumulated residuals of the equations for unemployment, productivity and import prices, in the VAR




(w ￿ h) + 0:254
(0:055)
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Notice that while the coe¢ cient of the unemployment rate did not change signi￿-
cantly with the introduction of the weak-exogeneity restrictions, the coe¢ cients of the
price equation exhibit a signi￿cant change from (15) to (17). However the estimates for
the coe¢ cients of the price equation seem now more reasonable, given the values of the
labour and imports shares on Portuguese GDP. As for the coe¢ cient of the unemploy-
ment rate we note that the estimate of -0.057, even though highly signi￿cant, appears
to be somewhat lower than standard elasticity estimates obtained in the literature for
other countries, which usually stand close to -0.10 (see, Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1994,
Bardsen et al., 2006). As regards the estimates of the loading coe¢ cients they are rel-
atively small suggesting that the disequilibrium in each market fades away very slowly,
as one might expect in the presence of wage and price rigidities22.
5 Structural analysis
Having established the cointegrating and weak-exogeneity properties of the model an
impulse response analysis may now be conducted where the identi￿cation of the struc-
tural shocks takes into account not only the restrictions implied by cointegration but
also the weak-exogeneity status of unemployment, productivity and import prices. Be-
sides those restrictions no additional constraints are imposed on the system so that the
impulse response analysis conducted below allows for the empirical interdependencies
22In terms of economic interpretation we notice that our VECM model is also consistent with wage
and price staggering and lack of synchronization among ￿rms￿price-setting, which would imply sluggish
adjustment to the equilibrium of wages and prices (see Andersen, 1994, ch.7).
20among all the variables of the system. We start by discussing the identi￿cation of the
structural shocks in the context of our VECM model and then look at the impulse
response functions of the structural shocks.
5.1 Identi￿cation of the structural shocks
Alternative approaches have been suggested in the literature to identify the structural
disturbances in a VECM. Here we follow the approach ￿rst suggested in King et al.
(1991) and further expanded in Crowder et al. (1999), and Gonzalo and Ng (2001)23.
In a VAR model with I(1) variables it is known that cointegration imposes restrictions
on the matrix of the long-run e⁄ects of the shocks to the system, which must be taken
into account for the identi￿cation of the structural innovations. In particular, in a
system with m endogenous variables and r cointegrating vectors the matrix of the long-
run e⁄ects has reduced rank m ￿ r, implying that m ￿ r structural shocks must have
permanent e⁄ects and r shocks must have transitory e⁄ects. Brie￿ y, let us assume that
the structural shocks which we denote by the vector vt have zero mean and identity
covariance matrix. For just identi￿cation of the shocks we need a total of m(m ￿ 1)=2
independent restrictions. Given that r(m ￿ r) restrictions can be derived from the
cointegration structure of the model this leaves us with m(m ￿ 1)=2 ￿ r(m ￿ r) further
restrictions for just identifying the structural innovations. More precisely, r(r ￿ 1)=2
additional restrictions, which must be placed in the matrix of contemporaneous e⁄ects,
are required to identify the transitory shocks, and (m ￿ r)(m ￿ r ￿ 1)=2 restrictions
that must be imposed on the matrix of the long-run e⁄ects are needed to identify the
permanent shocks.
23For a very simple and nice discussion of the identi￿cation issue in cointegrated VAR models, see
L￿tkephol (2006). For a critical assessment concerning the interpretation of the shocks, see Juselius
(2006) and Giannone et al. (2008). In particular, Juselius (2006) argues that structural restrictions on
the residuals derived from a theoretical model can only be interpretable and meaningful to the extent
that the basic hypotheses derived from the theoretical model are in line with the information in the
data. In a similar vein, Giannone et al. (2008) show that the estimation of the shocks is not consistent
in models contaminated by omitted variables problems.
21Our system has ￿ve variables and two cointegrating vectors so that three structural
shocks must have permanent e⁄ects and two shocks must have transitory e⁄ects. As
cointegration per se imposes six restrictions, we only need to impose three additional
restrictions on the long-run impact matrix to identify the three permanent shocks and
one restriction on the matrix of the contemporaneous e⁄ects to identify the two transitory
shocks.
Assuming that the relation between the reduced-form errors and the structural in-
novations is given by "t = Bvt, the long-run restrictions must be imposed on the matrix
A = CB where B is the matrix of the contemporaneous e⁄ects and C is the matrix of
the long-run impacts in the reduced form Moving Average representation of the VAR
model.
Given the existence of two cointegrating vectors (and three common stochastic
trends) we know that the A (5 ￿ 5) matrix has rank three so that the imposition of
the three identifying restrictions must take this condition into consideration. Assuming
that the ￿ve variables of the system are ordered as w, p, u, h and z, we consider the
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First notice that the two rightmost columns of zeros in the A matrix follow from
the restrictions imposed by cointegration, while the lower-right 3 ￿ 2 matrix of zeros in
the B matrix follows from the weak-exogeneity restrictions on u, h and z 24. Thus, the
identifying restrictions of the three permanent shocks are the three null restrictions in
24Imposing the weak-exogeneity restrictions during the estimation process has the implication that
the transitory shocks do not have a contemporaneous impact on the weakly-exogenous variables (see,
Fisher and Huh, 1999).
22the ￿rst and second columns of A while the identifying restriction of the two temporary
shocks is the null restriction in the ￿rst line of the B matrix. Given the ordering of the
variables, the speci￿c A and B matrices in (19) imply that we may de￿ne the following
￿ve structural shocks. The ￿rst three shocks are the permanent shocks in the sense that
they are allowed to have permanent e⁄ects on some (but not necessarily all) the variables
of the system, and the last two shocks are the transitory shocks that are not allowed to
have permanent e⁄ects on any of the variables of the system (which is ensured by the
fact that the two last columns of A are zero).
The ￿rst shock, which we shall denote as v1, is identi￿ed by the condition that it has
a zero long-run impact on the real variables, unemployment and productivity (and is
allowed to have permanent e⁄ects on the nominal variables: wages, consumer prices and
import prices). The second shock, denoted as v2, is identi￿ed by the condition that it
has a zero long-run e⁄ect on unemployment (and is allowed to have non-zero permanent
e⁄ects on the remaining variables) and the third shock, v3, is allowed to have permanent
e⁄ects on all the variables of the system. In its turn, the transitory shock, v4, is identi￿ed
from the B matrix as the shock that is allowed to have contemporaneous e⁄ects on both
wages and prices while shock v5 is not allowed to have a contemporaneous e⁄ect on
wages.
We note that the permanent shocks so de￿ned have a natural interpretation in the
context of our theoretical model. The permanent shock v1 can be interpreted as a
nominal shock and more speci￿cally as an import price shock, which according to our
theoretical model is expected to have long-run equal impact on nominal wages and prices,
thus leaving the real wage unchanged in the long run, and having no long-run impact
on unemployment and productivity. In the context of our model such a shock may stem
from an unexpected change in the prices of imported products or from an unexpected
change in the nominal exchange rate.
23The second permanent shock v2 can be interpreted as a productivity shock, which
given the fact that ￿ = 1 in the wage equation, will be completely absorbed by wages,
having no long-run direct e⁄ect on unemployment (and prices).
The third shock, v3, can be interpreted as a permanent unemployment shock, which
in the context of our theoretical model is expected to have permanent e⁄ects on the
nominal wages and prices, as well as on real wages. We can think of a permanent
unemployment shock as stemming from an unexpected increase in labour supply25.
Finally, v4 is de￿ned as a transitory shock to nominal wages (originating, for in-
stance, from a transitory demand shock) and v5 as a transitory shock to consumer prices
(stemming, for instance, from an unexpected monetary policy shock)26.
Given the identi￿cation above we get the estimated matrices of the contemporaneous
(B) and the long-run (A) e⁄ects reproduced in Tables 4 and 5, with asymptotic standard
errors in parenthesis27.
25In the context of our model it is not possible to distinguish between permanent labour supply
and permanent labour demand shocks because none of these variables is explicitly modelled. Usually
it is assumed that labour demand shocks have only transitory e⁄ects in this type of models (see, for
instance, Jacobson et al. 1997, Carstensen and Hansen, 2000, and Hansen and Warne, 2001). However,
in Br￿ggemann (2006), both permanent supply and labour demand shocks are considered.
The important point to notice is that in our model a unit root in unemployment means that there
must be some shocks which have permanent e⁄ects on unemployment. However, we do not take a stand
on whether such permanent changes in unemployment are solely the result of supply shocks or may also
result from permanent labour demand shocks.
26Usually changes in the bargaining power of the unions, in the unemployment bene￿t ratio and in
the duration of bene￿t entitlements are suggested as potential sources of autonomous wage growth (see,
Layard et al., 1991). However, in the context of our theoretical model, with two cointegrating vectors
that de￿ne the long-run wage and price equations, and where the nonstationarity of the model is driven
by three stochastic common trends (which are de￿ned from the cumulated residuals of the equations
for u, h, and z) it is not possible to think of a "permanent autonomous change" in wages originating
in shocks to the bargaining power of the unions, to the unemployment bene￿t ratio or to the duration
of bene￿t entitlements. In other words, our model assumes that the institutional features of the labour
market are constant or, if not, their changes have solely transitory e⁄ects on the variables of the system.
See also the discussion in section 2 concerning the wage equation.
27The model was estimated using Structural VAR 0.40, developed by Anders Warne.
245.2 Persistence of wages and prices
We now look at the impulse response functions with a especial emphasis on real wages
and wage and price in￿ ation. The impulse response functions of the ￿ve shocks are
depicted in Figures 3-728.
In order to quantify the speed of adjustment of such variables to the di⁄erent shocks
we compute some measures of persistence29. Given the type of information at hand (the
impulse response functions) we have two, basically equivalent, possibilities of computing
scalar measures of persistence. We can either compute the number of periods (quarters)
required for a certain proportion (10, 50, 90 percent, say) of the total disequilibrium
to dissipate (see, for instance, Dias and Marques, 2005) or compute the proportion
of the total disequilibrium that dissipates in a given number of periods (1, 4, 8, etc.).
These measures appear as particularly suitable to evaluate how fast the impulse response
functions approach the new long-run equilibrium level30. For simplicity we assume that
all the adjustments have taken place by the very last period of the simulations (the
40th period). This in fact seems a reasonable simplifying assumption given the visual
inspection of the impulse response functions in Figures 3-731.
Table 6 displays the proportion of the total disequilibrium that has dissipated after
1, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24 and 32 quarters. This way we may compare the di⁄erent speeds of
28The impulse response functions for the 5 original variables of the system are depicted together with
80% con￿dence bands.
29For the purpose of the exercise that follows we think of persistence as the speed with which the
impulse response function converges to the new equilibrium (long-run level) after a shock. This de￿nition
of persistence is fairly standard in the literature. See, for instance, Marques (2004) and the references
therein.
30Notice that we compute the persistence of the deviations from equilibrium, so that when the new
equilibrium of the variable is zero (for instance, real wage, wage in￿ ation and price in￿ ation, in the
case of the import price shock) there is no issue of concern. However, for those variables for which the
new equilibrium is not zero (for instance, nominal wages and prices, in the case of the import price
shock) we compute persistence of the deviations of the impulse response function from the new long-run
equilibrium level.
31Our measure of persistence may be signi￿cantly distorted by this simplifying assumption if an
important part of the total adjustment occurs after the assumed 40 periods, but is not a⁄ected if all the
adjustment occurs in less than the assumed 40 periods (as seems to be case in most of the computed
impulse response functions).
25adjustment across variables and across shocks in the short run, as well as in the medium
to long run.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses to a permanent positive import price shock
which, as we have seen, is identi￿ed by the condition that it has no long-run e⁄ects on
unemployment and productivity. An unexpected increase in import prices brings about
a permanent increase in nominal wages and prices such that in the long run the e⁄ect is
the same, as one could expect given the property of nominal homogeneity of the model.
As a result real wages as well as the labour share are una⁄ected in the long run.
However, in the short run prices increase faster than nominal wages so that in fact
real wages decrease during the ￿rst two years or so, before starting to slowly return
to the previous equilibrium level. While the largest impact on in￿ ation occurs almost
contemporaneously, the largest impact on wage changes only occurs after 10 quarters.
The real wages, the labour share and wage in￿ ation all display a very persistent hump-
shaped response type to this shock. From Table 6 we can see that after two years (8
quarters) only 53 percent, 31 percent and 53 percent of the total disequilibrium has
dissipated for real wages, wage in￿ ation and price in￿ ation, respectively. Moreover it
takes about 5 years for 90 percent of the disequilibrium to dissipate in the case of real
wages (about 6 years in case of wage and price in￿ ation).
The larger short-term persistence of wages following an import price shock comes
hardly as a surprise. On the one hand, the import price shock impacts directly on prices
and only indirectly on wages. On the other hand, it is known that in Portugal wages
are adjusted once a year on average (see, Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), while prices are
known to change more frequently, thus allowing a much faster short-term response of
prices to an import price shock32.
32According to Dias et al. (2004) the monthly frequency of price changes in Portugal, for the period
1992-2001, is 0.22 (higher than in most European countries) and the median duration of price spells
is of 8.5 months. On the other hand, using survey data for Portugal, Martins (2005) ￿nds that prices
change on average 1.9 times a year.
26Figure 4 depicts the impulse responses to a permanent productivity shock, which
is identi￿ed by the condition that it has no long-run e⁄ect on the unemployment rate.
In the context of our model productivity gains are all absorbed by wages in the long
run. Thus, in the long run we should expect nominal wages to increase in line with
productivity and prices and unemployment to remain constant, which is exactly what
we get in Figure 4. Also, as expected, we have a permanent increase in the real wage,
but no long-run e⁄ect on the labour share.
In the short run an increase in productivity brings about a decrease in the price
level (during the ￿rst 6-7 quarters) and a rapid increase in nominal wages, so that real
wages increase very fast and exhibit some overshooting before starting to converge to
the new equilibrium level. This increase in real wages implies a short-run increase in
unemployment that lasts for about one year.
A noticeable fact is that the adjustment of real wages to the new equilibrium level
is faster than in the case of an import price shock, as the same proportion of the total
adjustment occurs one year earlier (see Table 6). In the case of wage in￿ ation the
adjustment is even faster as 59 percent of the disequilibrium dissipates in the ￿rst two
years (as opposed to 31 percent in the case of the import price shock). It takes about
three years and a half for 90 percent of the disequilibrium to dissipate in the case of real
wages (about ￿ve years and a half in case of wage and price in￿ ation).
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses to a permanent positive unemployment shock
(or a labour supply shock), which is identi￿ed as the shock that may have long-run
e⁄ects on all the variables of the model. It is seen that such a shock is associated
with a permanent decrease in nominal wages, prices and productivity, in the long run.
As a result, real wages, as well as the labour share decrease permanently to a lower
equilibrium level.
27In the short run (￿rst two years), however, prices increase in line with a short-term
increase in import prices and in the nominal unit labour costs (stemming from a quicker
reaction of productivity than wages to the shock).
The largest decrease in wages is obtained one year after the shock (as expected, given
the annual revision of wages) despite the recorded increase in in￿ ation during the ￿rst
year. After two years 66 percent of the total disequilibrium in real wages has already
dissipated meaning that real wages are less persistent in face of an unemployment shock
than in face of an import price shock, even though slightly more persistent than in face
of a productivity shock. This accords with the idea that in Portugal real wages react
very quickly and signi￿cantly to negative news coming from the labour market. Thus,
if anything, real wages emerge as adjusting very quickly to shocks to unemployment,
suggesting that wage ￿ exibility, understood as the reaction of real wages to changes in
unemployment, is very high in the Portuguese labour market.
As far as wage and price in￿ ation are concerned, we see from Table 6 that wage in￿ a-
tion is also less persistent than in the case of the import price shock (slightly more than
in the case of the productivity shock), but price in￿ ation is somewhat more persistent,
as could be expected given that the import price shock impacts directly on domestic
in￿ ation whereas unemployment is expected to impact only indirectly through lower
wages. As regards the long-run adjustment, it takes about four years for 90 percent of
the disequilibrium to dissipate in the case of real wages (about six years in case of wage
and price in￿ ation).
We now take a brief look to the two transitory shocks (see Figures 6 and 7). The
interpretation of these shocks is not as intuitive as that of the permanent shocks, because
their identi￿cation is not so well grounded on economic theory.
The e⁄ects of the transitory positive wage shock look very much like the expected
e⁄ects of transitory positive demand shock. In fact, from Figure 6 we see that such
a shock brings about a temporary decrease in unemployment that lasts for about six
28quarters, and gives rise to a temporary nominal (and real) wage increase, being also
followed, two periods later, by a temporary increase in prices (and in￿ ation). Overall,
this shock may be seen as evidence that transitory demand shocks create a short-run
relation between real wages and unemployment that lasts for ￿ve so six quarters. On
the other hand, the e⁄ects of a transitory positive price shock look very much like the
expected e⁄ects of a monetary policy shock (unexpected increase in the interest rate),
with the so-called liquidity e⁄ect. In fact, from Figure 7 we see that in the very short
run there is an increase in in￿ ation (in the ￿rst two quarters) and a decrease afterwards.
Such a shock is also accompanied by a temporary decrease in import prices (brought
about by a currency appreciation) and a temporary increase in unemployment (due to
a decrease in demand) that brings about a temporary decrease in nominal (and real)
wages that lasts for about one year.
As expected, persistence of the transitory shocks is lower than that of the permanent
shocks. From Table 6 we see that for both shocks about 75 percent of the disequilibrium
in the real wage dissipates during the ￿rst two years, while in the same period, the
proportion of the adjustment of price in￿ ation following a transitory wage shock is
about 60 percent and that of the adjustment of wage in￿ ation following a transitory
price shock is 56 percent.
5.3 Forecast-errors variance decomposition of the shocks
We now investigate how important are the di⁄erent shocks in accounting for the observed
￿ uctuations in wages and prices, by looking at the forecast-error variance decompositions
for the variables of the model (see Table 7).
As expected, the two transitory wage and price shocks explain the largest amount of
the variation in the corresponding variables at the very short horizons of 1 to 4 quarters,
but little else.
29Shocks to import prices are not important for wage developments but are very im-
portant for price developments especially at the business cycle horizons (3-5 years). For
those periods, on average around 60 percent of the variation in the forecast errors in
prices is attributable to import price shocks.
The permanent productivity shock explains a considerable amount of the variation in
productivity but a relatively small proportion of the forecast errors in wages and prices
(somewhat less than 10 percent).
Unemployment shocks emerge as the most important shocks that explain not only
more than 90 percent of the variation in unemployment itself but also a considerable
amount of the variation in wage and productivity developments. This is especially the
case at the business cycle horizons in which these are responsible for about 80 percent
of the variation in the forecast errors of wages and for about 60 percent of the variation
in the forecast errors of productivity. For this horizon this shock is also important for
prices even though not as much as import price shocks, being responsible for about 20
percent of the variation in the corresponding forecast errors.
In summary, in the very short run (1 to 4 quarters) variation in the forecast-errors
of wages and prices is attributable to the transitory wage and price shocks, respectively.
At the business cycle horizon variation in the forecast errors of wages is attributable
mainly to unemployment shocks, whereas variation in the forecast errors of prices is
attributable mainly to import price shocks and, to a lesser extent, to unemployment
shocks. Productivity shocks explain a relatively small proportion of the forecast errors
in wages and prices.
5.4 Historical decomposition of forecast errors
Figure 8 illustrates the roles played by the di⁄erent shocks by plotting the forecast-
error at the three-year horizon (12 quarters) and the portion attributable to each shock
for wages and prices. It can be seen that the permanent unemployment shock plays
30a substantial role in explaining the forecast errors in wages and, to a lesser extent, in
prices and the permanent import price shock has an important role in explaining the
forecast errors in prices (even though at this horizon the temporary price shock also
plays a role). Looking at speci￿c episodes in Figure 8 we conclude that in the period
1996-2001 the decline in in￿ ation is attributable to the permanent import price shock,
as well as to the transitory price shock, whereas for the most recent period (after 2002)
only the permanent import price shock plays a major role. In turn, the forecast errors in
wages are mainly attributable to the permanent unemployment shock for all the sample
period (with the transitory wage shock also playing a role in the late nineties). Thus,
unemployment emerges as the major explanation for the wage acceleration in the period
1996-2000 (in this period unemployment decreased steadily from 6.3 percent in 1996q1 to
3.7 percent in 2000q4), as well as for the wage decceleration in the period 2001-2006 (in
this period unemployment increased steadily from 3.9 percent in 2001q1 to 7.9 percent
in 2006q4).
5.5 Consequences of the EMU for the impulse response func-
tions
The emergence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, with the introduction
of a common currency, implied a signi￿cant change in the monetary policy regime at
the country level, as the possibility of an independent monetary policy was lost. As
a consequence the reaction of the nominal exchange rate to some of the shocks that
hit the Portuguese economy during the sample period is likely to be di⁄erent for the
periods before and after the emergence of the EMU. In particular, this is the case of
idiosyncratic shocks (the ones that hit the Portuguese economy and not the euro area),
which are not expected to bring about signi￿cant changes in the nominal exchange rate in
the period after the emergence of the EMU. On the other hand, however, shocks common
to all the EMU countries (e.g., commodity or oil price shocks) may be expected to have
31signi￿cant implications for the nominal exchange rate, just as before the EMU. Thus,
as far as the e⁄ect of the import price shock is concerned, there are no strong reasons
to expect signi￿cant changes to have occurred with the emergence of the EMU. There
are also no strong reasons to believe that the e⁄ects of a productivity shock may have
been signi￿cantly a⁄ected with the emergence of the EMU, as in the estimated model
it does not involve a signi￿cant change in the exchange rate. However, the dynamics
of the remaining shocks (the permanent unemployment shock and the two transitory
wage and price shocks) may have undergone signi￿cant changes because the estimated
impacts involve changes on the import price de￿ ator (brought about by changes in the
nominal exchange rate) that cannot reasonably be assumed to hold for the EMU period.
A formal test of these hypotheses cannot however be conducted given the small number
of observations for the two sub-periods.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the persistence of aggregate wages and prices in the Portuguese
economy assuming a model of a unionized economy with imperfect competition, where
wages are determined through collective bargaining and prices are set by imperfectly
competitive ￿rms.
The analysis is conducted within a structural vector error-correction model
(SVECM), where two separate cointegrating relationships for wages and prices are iden-
ti￿ed by imposing the long-run restrictions implied by the theoretical model. The weak-
exogeneity status of unemployment, productivity and import prices, implicitly assumed
in the derivation of theoretical model, is investigated and comfortably accepted by the
data.
Following the cointegrating and weak-exogeneity properties of the system three per-
manent and two transitory shocks are identi￿ed. The permanent shocks, which we label
as "import price", "productivity" and "unemployment" shocks, are identi￿ed using the
32economic theory that underlies our theoretical model and, by de￿nition, they are allowed
to have signi￿cant long-run e⁄ects on some (or all) the variables of the system. The two
transitory shocks, which we label as "wage" and "price" shocks are identi￿ed by impos-
ing one restriction on the matrix of the contemporaneous e⁄ects and, by de￿nition, are
not allowed to have any long-run impact on the variables of the system.
As expected, we ￿nd that the relative persistence of wages and prices (including real
wages and wage and price in￿ ation) varies with the type of shock hitting the economy. In
particular, real wages are especially persistent following a permanent import price shock,
such that only 53 percent of the total disequilibrium dissipates in the ￿rst two years after
the shock. This compares to 66 percent in the case of a permanent unemployment shock
and to 69 percent in the case of permanent productivity shock (around 75 percent in case
of the two transitory wage and price shocks). Similar conclusions hold for wage in￿ ation.
Two years after the shock only 31 percent of the total disequilibrium has dissipated in
case of an import price shock, compared to 51 percent in the case of the unemployment
shock and 59 percent in the case of a productivity shock. In contrast, price in￿ ation is
more persistent following a permanent unemployment shock (only 42 percent of the total
disequilibrium dissipates in the ￿rst two years after the shock, compared to 53 percent in
the case of a permanent import price shock). These results accord with intuition because
an import price shock impacts directly on domestic prices (or domestic in￿ ation) and
only indirectly on wages, while an unemployment shock impacts directly on wages and
mainly indirectly on prices through lower wages.
From the analysis of the forecast-error variance decomposition we conclude that
at the business cycle horizon (3-5 years) variation in the forecast errors of wages are
attributable mainly to unemployment shocks (in about 80 percent) whereas variation in
the forecast errors of prices are attributable mainly to import price shocks (around 60
percent) and to unemployment shocks (around 20 percent). Productivity shocks explain
33a relatively small proportion of the forecast errors in wages and prices (less than 10
percent).
Looking at the historical decompositions we conclude that during the period 1996-
2001 the decline in in￿ ation is attributable both to the permanent import price shock as
well as to the transitory price shock, whereas for the most recent period (2002-2006) only
the permanent import price shock plays a major role. In turn, the forecast errors in wages
are mainly attributable to the permanent unemployment shock for all the sample period
(with the transitory wage shock also playing a role during the late nineties, 1996-1998).
Thus, unemployment emerges as the major factor explaining both the wage acceleration
in the period 1996-2000, as well as the wage decceleration in the period 2001-2006.
Concerning the implications for the impulse response analysis conducted in this pa-
per, we may expect the emergence of the European Monetary Union in 1999, to have
brought about signi￿cant changes for some of the shocks. This is especially the case
of the permanent unemployment shock (but also of the two transitory wage and price
shocks), which may be expected to have undergone signi￿cant changes because the esti-
mated impact involves signi￿cant changes on the import price de￿ ator (brought about
by changes in the nominal exchange rate) that cannot reasonably be assumed to hold
after the creation of the European Monetary Union. However, there seems not to be
strong reasons to expect that signi￿cant changes on the e⁄ects of the permanent import
prices and productivity shocks have occurred.
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38TABLE 1
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests
w p u h z
ADF(5)=-0.03 ADF(2)=-3.11 ADF(3)=-1.94 ADF(2)=-0.80 ADF(3)=-3.77
￿w ￿p ￿u ￿h ￿z
ADF(3)=-3.03 ADF(2)=-2.84 ADF(1)=-2.48 ADF(2)=-11.2 ADF(1)=-5.83
ADF(k) stands for the test with k lags, where k is the smallest number of lags that ensures that
the residuals do not display signi￿cant autocorrelation. The critical values of the test for w; p;h
and z (model with a time trend) are -4.14 (1%) and -3.49 (5%). The critical values of the test for
u, ￿w, ￿p;￿u, ￿h and ￿z (test with a constant) are -3.57 (1%), -2.92 (5%) and -2.59 (10%).
TABLE 2
Cointegration Trace Tests
Rank Corrected Corrected 90% 95% 99%
trace test(a) trace test(b) quantile quantile quantile
0 88.12*** 78.26*** 64.74 68.68 76.37
1 59.47*** 44.96 43.84 47.21 53.91
2 33.44** 21.08 26.70 29.38 34.87
3 14.02 4.19 13.31 15.34 19.69
4 1.90 0.55 2.71 3.84 6.64
Note: *** and ** mark signi￿cance at 1% and 5% respectively;
(a) Small sample corrected trace test using the Reinsel-Ahn correction (Cheung and Lai, 1993);
(b) Small sample corrected trace test using the Bartlett correction factors (Johansen, 2002);
39TABLE 3
Weak-exogeneity tests
(Under the hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors)
Equations
w p u h z
Test [Pvalue] 28.20 [0.000] 17.37 [0.000] 4.47 [0.107] 0.12 [0.941] 4.57 [0.102]
TABLE 4
Comtemporaneous (B) matrix of the structural VAR model 2
6
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
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TABLE 5
Long run (A=C*B) matrix of the structural VAR model 2
6 6
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
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Persistence of wages and prices
(Proportion of total desiquilibrium that has
dissipated after a given number of quarters)
Permanent import price shock
Quarters w p w ￿ p ￿w ￿p
1 0.145 0.176 0.024 0.067 0.163
4 0.350 0.392 0.191 0.135 0.325
8 0.585 0.599 0.532 0.313 0.532
12 0.745 0.749 0.728 0.572 0.660
16 0.847 0.851 0.829 0.713 0.782
20 0.915 0.916 0.914 0.816 0.861
24 0.956 0.956 0.954 0.893 0.914
32 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.968 0.975
Permanent productivity shock
1 0.200 0.078 0.349 0.039 0.202
4 0.432 0.268 0.603 0.358 0.389
8 0.573 0.542 0.692 0.592 0.580
12 0.743 0.693 0.859 0.690 0.760
16 0.849 0.816 0.922 0.864 0.786
20 0.908 0.897 0.941 0.892 0.883
24 0.956 0.944 0.981 0.931 0.924
32 0.992 0.991 0.995 0.978 0.979
Permanent unemployment shock
1 0.171 0.096 0.331 0.082 0.115
4 0.375 0.286 0.557 0.335 0.280
8 0.568 0.522 0.662 0.505 0.421
12 0.729 0.689 0.809 0.599 0.597
16 0.837 0.811 0.889 0.755 0.706
20 0.906 0.893 0.993 0.834 0.816
24 0.952 0.943 0.969 0.897 0.884
32 0.992 0.991 0.995 0.969 0.966
Transitory wage shock
1 0.170 0.029 0.201 0.039 0.090
4 0.528 0.105 0.574 0.456 0.341
8 0.599 0.473 0.743 0.704 0.590
12 0.725 0.621 0.849 0.841 0.819
16 0.851 0.739 0.926 0.923 0.876
20 0.886 0.851 0.952 0.954 0.934
24 0.940 0.901 0.983 0.970 0.965
32 0.981 0.972 0.994 0.993 0.991
Transitory price shock
1 0.032 0.317 0.239 0.066 0.414
4 0.197 0.663 0.574 0.240 0.618
8 0.581 0.740 0.767 0.559 0.816
12 0.798 0.840 0.868 0.815 0.890
16 0.832 0.922 0.925 0.889 0.951
20 0.933 0.942 0.970 0.934 0.972
24 0.953 0.972 0.983 0.972 0.982
32 0.990 0.991 0.996 0.995 0.996
41TABLE 7
Forecast-error variance decomposition
Fraction of the forecast-error variance decomposition
attributable to each shock, at di⁄erent horizons
Permanent import price shock
Horizon w s:e: p s:e: u s:e: h s:e: z s:e:
1 0.047 (0.063) 0.004 (0.021) 0.005 (0.044) 0.016 (0.076) 0.983 (0.084)
4 0.017 (0.057) 0.114 (0.150) 0.029 (0.091) 0.007 (0.025) 0.929 (0.091)
8 0.021 (0.073) 0.260 (0.233) 0.030 (0.088) 0.003 (0.013) 0.860 (0.123)
12 0.047 (0.095) 0.457 (0.230) 0.025 (0.074) 0.002 (0.012) 0.813 (0.181)
16 0.071 (0.109) 0.605 (0.167) 0.022 (0.062) 0.002 (0.011) 0.823 (0.177)
20 0.082 (0.116) 0.678 (0.127) 0.018 (0.053) 0.002 (0.009) 0.824 (0.168)
40 0.101 (0.121) 0.658 (0.296) 0.011 (0.033) 0.001 (0.005) 0.679 (0.256)
Permanent productivity shock
1 0.006 (0.022) 0.013 (0.031) 0.059 (0.074) 0.905 (0.128) 0.007 (0.055)
4 0.025 (0.037) 0.093 (0.103) 0.008 (0.014) 0.654 (0.175) 0.006 (0.028)
8 0.127 (0.094) 0.135 (0.146) 0.004 (0.007) 0.491 (0.204) 0.031 (0.087)
12 0.111 (0.096) 0.105 (0.135) 0.005 (0.012) 0.433 (0.219) 0.066 (0.126)
16 0.098 (0.095) 0.075 (0.108) 0.005 (0.012) 0.404 (0.228) 0.069 (0.133)
20 0.094 (0.097) 0.052 (0.077) 0.004 (0.011) 0.388 (0.236) 0.070 (0.137)
40 0.083 (0.099) 0.018 (0.018) 0.003 (0.007) 0.365 (0.263) 0.053 (0.115)
Permanent unemployment shock
1 0.060 (0.070) 0.085 (0.072) 0.936 (0.070) 0.078 (0.114 0.010 (0.063)
4 0.460 (0.137) 0.354 (0.169) 0.955 (0.094) 0.333 (0.175) 0.018 (0.084)
8 0.731 (0.150) 0.391 (0.226) 0.958 (0.102) 0.503 (0.206) 0.037 (0.059)
12 0.778 (0.168) 0.282 (0.210) 0.965 (0.091) 0.562 (0.223) 0.059 (0.124)
16 0.794 (0.182) 0.209 (0.132) 0.971 (0.078) 0.593 (0.233) 0.053 (0.110)
20 0.801 (0.190) 0.192 (0.102) 0.975 (0.068) 0.609 (0.240) 0.055 (0.079)
40 0.810 (0.197) 0.303 (0.313) 0.985 (0.043) 0.634 (0.266) 0.234 (0.249)
Transitory wage shock
1 0.888 (0.079) 0.000 (0.004) 0 (￿ ) 0 (￿ ) 0 (￿ )
4 0.469 (0.115) 0.004 (0.009) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002)
8 0.102 (0.044) 0.034 (0.021) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.005)
12 0.048 (0.025) 0.033 (0.019) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.011 (0.009)
16 0.028 (0.018) 0.024 (0.013) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.010 (0.009)
20 0.017 (0.011) 0.018 (0.010) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.010 (0.008)
40 0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.007 (0.005)
Transitory price shock
1 0 (￿ ) 0.898 (0.077) 0 (￿ ) 0 (￿ ) 0 (￿ )
4 0.030 (0.022) 0.434 (0.124) 0.007 (0.012) 0.004 (0.007) 0.046 (0.034)
8 0.019 (0.016) 0.179 (0.072) 0.006 (0.012) 0.002 (0.004) 0.068 (0.044)
12 0.016 (0.019) 0.122 (0.049) 0.004 (0.007) 0.001 (0.003) 0.051 (0.035)
16 0.009 (0.010) 0.087 (0.035) 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.002) 0.045 (0.033)
20 0.005 (0.007) 0.060 (0.027) 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 (0.002) 0.041 (0.030)
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Figure 2: First di⁄erences of the logs of the variables
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Figure 3: Responses from a unit shock to import prices.
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Figure 4: Responses from a unit shock to productivity
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Figure 5: Responses from a unit shock to unemployment
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Figure 6: Responses from a unit shock to wages
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Figure 7: Responses from a unit shock to prices
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Figure 8: Historical decomposition of 12 quarter forecast errors in w and p
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